A practical mandatory access control (MAC) model for XML databases is presented in this paper. The label type and label access policy can be defined according to the requirements of different applications. In order to preserve the integrity of data in XML databases, a constraint between a read-access rule and a write-access rule in label access policy is introduced. Rules for label assignment and propagation are presented to alleviate the workload of label assignments. Furthermore, a solution for resolving conflicts in label assignments is proposed. Rules for update-related operations, rules for exceptional privileges of ordinary users and the administrator are also proposed to preserve the security of operations in XML databases. The MAC model, we proposed in this study, has been implemented in an XML database. Test results demonstrated that our approach provides rational and scalable performance.
Introduction
XML has been increasingly used in a variety of applications, and has become the standard for describing and exchanging data over the Internet. As more and more XML documents are stored in XML databases, the security of XML databases has become an important issue. Access control is one of the most important measures in guaranteeing the security of XML databases. The existing access control models for XML databases can be generally catalogued into two types: the discretionary access control model (DAC) and the mandatory access control model (MAC). In the DAC models, a subject who is a creator of an object can discretionally control privileges of other subjects accessing the object in XML databases but cannot resist attacks like Trojan horse because of inherent flaws.
In a MAC model based on BLP model [2] , every object is assigned a label which specifies the security privilege of the object, and every user is assigned a label which specifies what objects he/she can access. The label in [2] is a binary-tuple L=<l, c> consisting of a classification l, which belongs to an ordered sequence (e.g. unclassified ≤ confidential ≤ secret ≤ top-secret); and a category c, which is a subset of a set consisting of non-hierarchical and unordered elements (e.g.{HumanResource, Financial, Technical}). In the following discussion, we assume that L (s) and L(o) denote the labels for a subject and an object respectively. L(s).l is the classification of the label L(s) and L(s).c represents the category for the subject s. When an object is accessed by a subject, the label of the subject is compared with the label of the object using the following two rules:
(1) simple security property: A subject s can read an object o only if L(o) ≤ L(s). (2) *-property: A subject s can write an object o only if L(s) ≤ L(o).

In the simple security property, label L(o) ≤ L(s) if and only if L(o).l ≤ L(s).l and L(o).c ⊆ L(s).c. We call L(o)≤ L(s) as L(s) dominates L(o).
However, when applying the BLP model to databases, the *-property has to be modified to maintain the integrity of the data. Writing objects is allowed only when the subjects and objects have the same label. Therefore, the simple security property and the strict *-property need to be enforced [1, 15] . The strict *-property is described as follows:
strict *-property: A subject s can write an object o only if L(o)=L(s).
The MAC security of a system based on the BLP model is sufficient in many cases, and it has been widely applied in military and government information systems [2] . However, the rules for label comparison in these systems are too rigorous in some cases. It indicates that the larger the category for an object is, the fewer the users that can access it. In some applications [18, 21] , the rule for label comparison is not as rigorous as this. On the contrary, the requirement is: the larger the category for an object is, the more the users that can access it. Moreover, in these applications the structure of the label may be different from the structure of the label in the BLP model. In order to meet the needs of these applications, [14, 18, 21] have enhanced the flexibility of the MAC mechanism in relational databases. However, the existing MAC models [4, 15, 23] for XML databases are all based on the BLP model. The issue of how to make a flexible and practical MAC model for XML databases has not been addressed in the literatures. In order to overcome the limitations of previous MAC models for XML databases, new rules have to be introduced to make a MAC model be more flexible and can be applied for multi-purposes, meanwhile the security properties of the MAC model are maintained. That is the focus of this study.
We propose a mandatory access control (MAC) model that consists of 12 rules specifying the constraints between a read-access rule and a write-access rule in label access policy, label assignment and propagation, a solution for resolving label assignment conflicts, and updating-related operations (including INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE) for XML databases. Fig. 1 illustrates the relationships amongst these 12 rules in our MAC model. Every node denotes a rule and the edge between two nodes denotes the relationship between the two rules. If there is an edge from rule A to rule B, rule A must take effect prior to rule B. After the structure of the labels and the label access policy are defined in the MAC, Rule 1 specifies the constraint between the read-access rule and the writeaccess rule in label access policy to preserve the integrity of data in XML databases. Moreover, several label access policies can be defined in an XML database. Different label access policies can be assigned to different XML schemas and XML documents, but one document can only be assigned with one policy. Rule 2 specifies that a XML schema and its documents must be assigned with the same label access policy, and then a subject and an object can be assigned a label respectively. Rule 3 specifies that the label of the root of a schema is the label of its creator. Only after the XML schema is loaded into an XML database, XML documents can then be loaded. Rule 7 indicates that how to specify the label of the root of a XML document that has been loaded. There are three methods of assigning labels to objects in an XML document: assign labels to objects arbitrarily; propagate labels from the ancestors of the objects; and propagate labels from the nodes in a schema associated with the objects. Rule 4 and Rule 5 are related to label propagation. Rule 6 is for deciding the unique label for every object in an XML document. After every element or attribute in an XML document is assigned a label, the update-related operations for the document can be applied, which are specified in Rule 8, Rule 9 and Rule 10. Moreover, the exceptional privileges for ordinary users who create the XML documents and the exceptional privileges for administrator are specified in Rule 11 and Rule 12. The main contributions of this paper are:
Rule11 Rule12 <LabelType name = "COMDEPT"> <LabelComponents> <LabelComponent name = "Secret" type = "order"> <value>unclassified </value> <value>secret</value> <value>top-secret</value> </LabelComponent> <LabelComponent name = "Dept" type = "unorder"> <value>Technique</value> <value>HumanResource </value> <value>Financial</value> </LabelComponent> </LabelComponents> </LabelType> (1) A practical MAC model for XML databases is proposed. The label structure and label access policy can be defined according to the application requirements. We not only can define label access policies which are similar to label access policies in the BLP model for applications with high security, but also can define label access policies according to the application requirements in the way which is different from the BLP model. Therefore, our practical MAC model for XML databases can be used for more different applications.
(2) In order to preserve the integrity of data in XML databases, a constraint between the read-access rule and write-access rule in label access policy has been introduced. ( 3) The rules for label assignment and label propagation are addressed to alleviate the workload of label assignments. A solution for the problem of conflicts in label assignments has been proposed.
(4) The rules for update-related operations and the rules for exceptional privileges of both ordinary users and the administrators are developed to preserve the security of operations involving SELECT, UPDATE, and DELETE in XML databases.
(5) We implemented our newly proposed practical MAC model in an XML database. All newly proposed rules and functions have been implemented. This enables us to verify the feasibility, effectiveness and flexibility of our approach. Our approach has been validated against the XMARK benchmark and the test results shown that the performance is rational and scalable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the preliminary concepts of our model. Section 3 describes the practical MAC model for XML databases in detail. Section 4 discusses the implementation considerations of the system. Section 5 illustrates the experimental results. Section 6 describes the related work.
Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions and suggestions for future work.
Preliminary Concepts
The structure of the label in our MAC model is as follows: each label is specified by a label type, and the label type specifies what components the label type consists of, i.e. every component in a label is specified by a label component type. Normally, the structure of a label is specified by the administrator, which may or may not be the same as the structure of the label in the BLP model. LP indicates that when a subject s∈ S reads an object o∈ O, the labels for the subject and the object must conform to the read-access rule. The labels for the subject and the object are compared according to the operations specified in LP.LASS.OP to determine whether the subject can read the object or not. In the following discussion, if a
For a label access policy, we can define label access rules in an XML format file. The format of a rule for specifying an operator between two components in the labels of a subject and an object is:
Subject.component-name <operator> Object.component-name Example 3. Defining a label access policy. In Fig.3 , a label access policy for the label type COMDEPT (in Fig.2) is defined. It consists of a read-access rule and a write-access rule.
Fig. 3. A label access policy
In XML databases with our mandatory access control, the labels of a subject and an object are compared according to the label access rules. Our model supports the INTERSECTION operator when we compare two labels;
this is different from the other MAC models [4, 15, 23] for XML databases. However, when the operation < Policy labeltype = " COMDEPT "> <!--A subject is allowed to read an object, iff Secret component of the subject is higher than or equal to --!> <!--Secret component of the object and the intersection of Dept of the subject and Dept of the object are not empty --!> <!--A subject is allowed to write an object, iff Secret component of the subject is less than or equal to --!> <!--Secret component of the object and Dept component of the subject is in Dept component of the object --> <Rules action = "read" > <Rule> subject.Secret GE object.Secret </Rule> <Rule> subject.dept INTERSECTION object.dept </Rule> </Rules> <Rules action = "write" > <Rule>subject. Secret 
The Mandatory Access Control Model
The rule for label access policy
When a subject attempts to access an object, the read-access rule is applied to decide whether the user can read the object. When a subject attempts to insert an object into an XML document, or attempts to update or delete an object from an XML document, the read-access rule must be evaluated to locate the object to be inserted, updated or deleted. Therefore, in our MAC model any user can read what he/she wrote before. Otherwise, the integrity of data would not be maintained. Therefore, we introduce the following constraint:
Rule 1. The constraint of label access policy. For a label access policy LP=(S, O, LASS), the write-access rule contains the read-access rule. Namely, for any subject s∈S, and any object o∈O, the privilege of L(s) ω w in LP.LASS L(o) is higher than L(s) ω r in LP.LASS L(o).
Labelled subjects and XML documents
The subjects of our MAC model are the users who access the XML databases, or application programs, or agents on behalf of users. After the label type is created, the administrator assigns labels to users, elements or attributes in XML documents or schemas. Every user except the administrator has a unique label, and so does as every object in XML documents.
The objects are elements/attributes in XML documents and schemas. We denote the objects in XML documents using XPath [19] . As the XML document and schema conform to the same XML grammar, the labelled schema and its XML documents have the same notations. We only formally describe the labelled XML document below. The same principle can be applied for formally defining XML schema. (1) Ve is the set of all elements in the document;
(2) vr is the root of the document, vr is also an element of the document, vr∈Ve; (3) Va is the set of all attributes in the document; (4) Ns is the set of names, including the names of elements and attributes; (5) Ls is the set of all labels with a label type T; (6) T is the label type which specifies the structure of the labels in the document; (7) LP is the label access policy, and LP determines the set of label access rules including a read-access rule and a write-access rule; (8) 
. Different elements or attributes may have the same label, and every element or attribute has only one label.
For a document not being labelled, it is a seven-tuple Doc= (Ve, vr, Va, Ns, elemR, attrR, nameR) . The meanings of these symbols are the same as those in the XDoc.
In the following discussion, we use XDoc and XSch to denote a labelled XML document and schema, respectively. For example, we also denote XDoc.T and XDoc.LP as a label type and a label access policy for the XML document. From the definition of XDoc, we have: for any label access rule las∈XDoc.LP.LASS, XDoc.T=las.T.
The label assignment rules for XML objects
Multiple label access policies can be defined for different security requirements but every document can be assigned only one label access policy. After an XML document or schema is loaded, a label access policy is first assigned for them. Then, the labels for elements or attributes in the XML document and schema are assigned.
The constraint of a label access policy between an XML schema and its documents
An XML schema defines a set of XML documents with the same structures and similar contents. The label access policy should be the same for the schema and its documents.
Rule 2. The constraint of label access policy between an XML schema and its documents. If the labelled XML schema is XSch and one of its documents is XDoc, then XSch.LP=XDoc.LP.
The rules for label assignment and propagation
When an XML schema is created, the label for the root of the schema should be assigned. For an ordinary user, when he/she creates an XML schema, the label for the root of the schema is equal to the label of the user. So we have the following Rule 3:
Rule 3. The label for the root of an XML schema. For an ordinary subject s, if s creates an XML schema sch, then L(sch.vr)=L(s).
If the schema is created by the administrator, the label for the root of the schema must be assigned explicitly.
Rule 12 (in section 3.3.5) is about the exceptional privilege for the administrator.
There are a large number of elements and attributes in an XML document. If each element or attribute is assigned a label, the workload for management of these labels would be enormous. One solution to his is that we may make use of the following features of XML to alleviate the administrator's workload:
(1) An XML schema defines a set of XML documents with the same structure and similar contents. Usually, these XML documents have the same security attributes; (2) XML documents are hierarchical and every element has its sub-elements or attributes except for the leaves.
The administrator needs to only assign labels to XML schemas and some elements in XML documents, then the labels are propagated to instance elements or attributes in the XML documents of the schema, or the labels are propagated to descendent elements and attributes of the labelled elements downward from the root to leaves. 
A solution for conflicts of label assignments
Rule 3, Rule 4 and Rule 5 are designed to enhance the flexibility of label assignment and alleviate the workload of the administrator, but may result in the assignments of several different labels to one object. For example, an element in an XML document may have three labels. The first one is propagated from its ancestor, the second one is propagated from the schema, and the third one is assigned directly by the administrator. In order to guarantee that every object in an XML document has only one label, we introduce a rule for deciding labels under a specific label access policy to solve label assignments conflicts. 
Rule 6. The label deciding rule. Assume a read access rule lasr=(L, T, OP, r), L
Rule 6 can be extended to decide and assign a unique label for an object when the object may be assigned up to three labels due to direct assignment or propagation. Because the least upper bound does not exist for the INTERSECTION operator in the sense of the least upper bound defined for the CONTAIN operator in [15] , a simple deciding rule for an INTERSECTION operator is used in Rule 6. When an INTERSECTION operator is specified for a component in a label access policy, we specify that the component of the resulting label is at the intersection of the corresponding components of two labels. Such a case may occur when some object cannot be accessed by any users except the administrator or the creator of the XML document which the object belongs to. The example below illustrates this problem.
Example 5. If the labels <secret, {Technique, Financial}> and <secret, {HumanResource}> are assigned to an object by propagation rules and direct assignment, and the intersection of {Technique, Financial} and {HumanResource} is empty, then the object cannot be accessed by any user except the administrator and the creator of the XML document which the object belongs to.
Consequently, Rule 6 guarantees that the security of a sub-node is higher than the security of its parent in an XML document. In the following discussion, we use function label_comput(L 1 
The rules for modification-related operations
As the label access policy for an XML database is defined according to the security requirements of the applications, modification-related operations may have an impact on the labels or the structure of XML documents.
When a subject loads an XML document, the label of the subject is compared with the label of the root of the schema. If they conform to the write-access rule in the label access policy, the label of the root would be decided from the label of the subject and the label of the root of the schema of the loaded XML documents by Rule 6. We have the following Rule 7 for loading an XML document: 
L(Doc.vr)= label_comput(L(s), L(XSch.vr)).
Rule 6 and Rule 7 indicate that the MAC can resolve the security problems in the DAC models. We give the following example.
Example 6. Assume that we have only enforced the DAC in an XML database. A user s1 could access several objects (not all objects) in an XML document Doc1, but user s2 could not access any objects in Doc1. User s1 could leak information in Doc1 by creating a new document Doc2 which consists of the objects user s1 could access, and then user s1 authorizes all the access privileges of all objects in Doc2 to s2. Therefore, s2 would indirectly be able to obtain the information in Doc1. If the MAC is enforced by the label access policy in Fig.3 in the XML database, s1
and s2 are assigned labels L(s1) and L(o 2 ') ).
As the insertion and deletion operations may modify the structure of the XML documents, the structure of the updated documents must conform to the constraints of their schema. When an XML schema is defined, the maximum or minimum occurrences for the sub-elements of an element may be defined. So the operations should follow the constraints: the number of sub-elements must be no more than the maximum occurrences defined for the element after the sub-element is inserted into an element; the number of sub-elements left must be no less than the minimum occurrences defined for the element after a sub-element is deleted from the element. 
Exceptional privileges
Ordinary users can load XML documents and schemas. After an ordinary user has loaded an XML document or a schema and the administrator has assigned the labels, the ordinary user may not be able to query all the objects in the document or schema because of the label access policy. In order to prevent confusions for ordinary users "missing" objects he/she loaded earlier and to prevent transmission of information covertly, we intgioduce exceptional privileges to ordinary users who create XML documents or schemas.
Rule 11. Exceptional privileges for creators of XML documents and schemas. If an ordinary user s loads an XML document or a schema, and the administrator assigns labels to the objects in the document or the schema, then for any object o∈ Ve U Va in XDoc, s can access o without complying with the label access policy.
Although the administrator maintains labels in the system, the administrator does not have a label. How do we deal with the initial labels for the XML documents and schemas loaded by the administrator? To solve the problem, we give the following Rule 12.
Rule 12. Exceptional privileges for the administrator. The administrator can load XML documents and schemas, and the administrator must also assign an initial label to the root of the loaded XML documents and schemas.
Implementation Considerations
The architecture of the MAC for XML databases
We have implemented our MAC model in an XML database management system. We used Dom4J as our parser for the XML schemas and documents. The main tool for the program is JDK1.4+Eclipse3.0+Dom4J [6, 7] . The architecture of the XML database management system is shown in Fig.4 . It consists of five main modules, which are all within the rectangle with dashed line: policy management module, schema and document loader module, policy service module, query module (process read-only operations) and modification module (process update-related operations).
A tool was developed for managing label access policy at the client end. With this tool, the label type and label access policy can be defined and managed. After the policy management module accepts requests from this tool, it converts the label access policy and label type into an XML file and stores the XML file into the security repository.
There are two types of XML files in the security repository: label access policy file and label assignment file for users. The security repository is invisible to ordinary users but is visible to the administrator.
The administrator and ordinary users can load the schemas or XML documents by using the schema and document loader module. The initial labels for the schemas and documents are assigned by the policy service module. The labelled XML schemas and documents are stored into the labelled XML documents and schemas repository.
Moreover, by using this tool labels are assigned to users and objects in XML documents and schemas. For objects in an XML document, the unique labels are computed and the labelled XML documents and schemas are stored.
Fig. 4. Architecture of the MAC in XML database
The query module has two sub-modules: query rewriting and executor. When a user submits a query, in the query module the original query is first rewritten according to the label of the user, then the rewritten query is executed, and the final results are returned to the user. The objects in XML documents are updated by the modification module.
When a user submits a modification request, the query module is executed first to find or locate the objects to be updated, deleted or inserted, and then updated documents are stored in the XML database.
Key techniques for implementation
The assignment of labels for users and objects in XML documents
When a label type is defined, it is converted into an inner denotation in the system. For example, an element in the order label components is denoted as a number, and a set of the unordered label components is represented as a string of '1' or '0' that denotes whether an element occurs or not. Therefore, if an operator for an unordered label component includes CONTAIN, and when the unordered label component for a user contains the unordered label component for an object, each '0' in the string for the unordered label component of the object indicates that the In order to assign labels to documents in an XML database, the structure of XML documents is modified. A label is attached as an attribute for each object in the documents. However, the schema of the XML documents should not be changed because the XML schema defines the structure of many XML documents. So when an XML schema is loaded, a schema map document is created for the schema. Initially, the schema map document is the XML schema, then the mapping relationships between the objects in the schema and objects in the XML documents are added, and the labels for the schema are also stored as attributes of the objects in the schema map document. The schema map document is also stored in the labelled XML documents and schemas repository. When the administrator assigns a label to the objects in XML documents or the schemas, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 (shown in Fig.5 ) are executed to compute the labels for objects in XML documents.
When all the objects in an XML document are assigned a label, the XML document is stored to the labelled XML documents and schemas repository. Clearly, the size of an XML document would be increased and that would affect the performance of the system because of the extra I/O and other operations costs.
Query rewriting
After the users and XML documents are labelled, the system could accept the Query operation (deals with readonly operations -SELECT operations) and update-involved operations in the XML database. Because the Query Algorithm 1: Assigning a label to an object in an XML schema Input: a parsed schema map document tree for the schema, assume Rs is the root; the path expression for the schema path and the label label1 Output: the newly labelled XML schema map document Step1: find the object so in the schema map document tree for the path Step2: if (the parent of so exists) then find the parent pa of so; if (the label of pa exists) then obtain the label paLabel of pa; label1 = label_comput(label1, paLabel); end end step 3: if (so has a label) then obtain the label label_old of so; label1 = label_comput(label1, label_old); end assign label1 to so obtain the set of subnodes of so Set_So; if (the Set_So is empty) then return; for each c in Set_So call algorithm 1 recursively with the parameters: Rs, c, label1 end Algorithm1
Algorithm 2: Assigning a label to an object in an XML document Input: a parsed XML document doc1, assume Rt is the root; the path expression path for an object in the XML document doc1; the label label1 Output: the newly labelled XML document tree Step1: according to the path, find the objects to a set path_Set from the document tree doc1 for each element io in path_Set do Step2:
if (io has a corresponding schema object) then obtain the label schemaLabel for the corresponding schema object of io; label1 = label_comput(label1, schemaLabel); operation is an important operation in the system and is the basis of other operations, we describe the process of Query operation in the system in detail.
CreatePredicate: generate security predicate according to the label of the user and the read-access control rule input: label of user userLabel the read-access control rule AccessRule output: the security predicate for the query: predicate predicate = ""; LABEL = "@label"; obtain the number of components m from AccessRule for i = 1 to m do begin obtain the ith operation pi in AccessRule.OP.pi; sub_predicate = ""; obtain the ith component coml of userLabel; switch (pi) case CONTAIN: for each character chj in coml do if (chj= = '0') then if (sub_predicate = ="") then sub_predicate = "substring(" + LABEL + i+ "," + j + "," +'0'); else sub_predicate += " AND substring(" + LABEL + i+ " , " + j + ", " +'0'); endif break; case INTERSECTION:
for each character chj in coml do if (chj = = '1') then if (sub_predicate = ="") then sub_predicate = " substring(" + LABEL + i +"," + j + "," +'1'); else sub_predicate += " OR substring(" + LABEL + i +"," + j + "," +'1'); endif break case IN:
for each character chj in coml do if (chj = = '1') then if (sub_predicate = ="") then sub_predicate = " substring(" + LABEL + i +", " + j + "," +'1'); sub_predicate += " AND substring(" + LABEL + i+"," + j + "," +'1'); endif break; case EQUAL: sub_predicate = LABEL + i + "=" + coml; break; case >=: sub_predicate = LABEL + i + "<=" + coml; break; case >: sub_predicate = LABEL + i + "<" + coml; break; case <=: sub_predicate = LABEL + i + ">=" + coml; break; case <: sub_predicate = LABEL + i + ">" + coml; break; endswitch if (predicate=="") then predicate = sub_predicate else predicate += " AND (" + sub_predicate + ")"; enddo return predicate; endCreatePredicate Query_rewritten: rewrite the query Q according to the label of the user userLabel Input: the query Q expressed by Xpath; the label of the user userLabel Output: the rewritten query Qd obtain the labelled schema sch for query Q; obtain the read-access control rules AccessRule according to sch; predicate = CreatePredicate(userLabel, AccessRule,); decompose the query Q into a set of searching expressions CC according to the separator '/' or '//' or other separators; /* if '/' or '//' is included in an expression, we did not divide the expression into two sub expressions*/ Qd=""; Qd += the first separator for each node c in CC do begin divide c into a set of sub expressions EXP; for each con in EXP do c1='['; c2=']'; qc1=""; if con contains c1 then begin get the node node1 before c1; if (node1 != NULL) then Qd += node1 + '[' + predicate; endif find another character c2 matched with c1 ; get string str1 between c1 and c2; qc1 = Query_rewritten(str1, userLabel) ; end /* if con contain c1 */ else begin divide con into a set of searching conditions SC for each search condition qc in SC do /*qc contained predication conjunction*/ if qc contain one of the operations <,<=, >, >=, = then divide qc into q/*queried node*/, op/*operation*/), const/*constant*/, and conj/*conjuction, can be null*/; qc1 += q + '[' + predicate + ']' + op + const + conj; else qc1 += q + '[' + predicate + ']'; endif end if (con contains c1 and node1 !=NULL and qc1 != "") then Qd += ' and ' + qc1 + ']'; else Qd += qc1; endif Qd += conjunction predicate after con end /* for con*/ Qd += separator '/' or '//' or other separators; end /* for node c*/ return Qd; endQuery_rewritten When a user submits a query request, the system checks every XML document involved in the query whether the document was created by the user or not. If it was created by the user, Rule 11 is applied and the query results are returned without the MAC involvement.
If the document was not created by the user, the query processing continues. The label access policy is searched from the security repository to obtain the label access rules. Then the query request is parsed and the query is first rewritten according to the label of the user and read-access rule by adding the label of the user as a searching condition in the query. The pseudo code for the query rewritten is shown in Fig.6 . Next, the rewritten query is executed, and the intermediate objects which do not satisfy the read-access rule will be filtered. While a query is processed in this way, an inference attack can be prevented, as illustrated in the following example 7.
Example 7. Assume that the label access rules, as shown in Fig.3 
Experimental Results
We tested our MAC model in an XML database system for a number of purposes: to demonstrate the validity of our MAC model; to process different types of queries; to evaluate the performance impact of adding our MAC into an XML database. The experimental results are presented in this section. The test environment was two desktop computers with 2.8GHZ CPU, 1G memory and Windows XP (SP2) operating system. The XMark benchmark dataset [26] was used in our experiments. We used the tools of XMark to generate XML documents of different sizes, assigned the labels to objects in XML schemas and documents, and measured the response time of different queries with and without the MAC be installed.
The labels for subjects and objects
We used two types of applications (App1 and App2) in our experiments. The main feature of App1 is that the larger the category for an object is, so a smaller number of users that can access it, and different from App1, the main feature of App2 is that the larger the set of category for an object is, so a larger number of users can access it. The label types shown in Table 1 are used in the two applications. Two label access policies AP1 and AP2 were defined in the Table 2 . From the label access policies in Table 2 , we can see that the application App1 is for a multilevel secure system and the application App2 is not.
After the label types and label access policies were created, the administrator loaded the XML schemas and documents, and created four users Lisa, Tom, Alice and Mary for App1 and two users Mary, Tom for App2. The administrator then assigned the labels shown in Table 3 to those users in these two applications. Next, the administrator assigned labels to the XML schemas and documents. Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the labels assigned to XML schema and documents. The first label access policy AP1 for App1
Read rule The level of the subject is larger than the level of the object, and the category of the subject contains the category of the object Write rule
The level of the subject is equal to the level of the object, and the category of the subject is equal to the category of the object The second label access policy AP2 for App2
Read rule
The level of the subject is larger than the level of the object, and the category of the subject is contained in the category of the object Write rule
The level of the subject is equal to the level of the object, and the category of the subject is equal to the category of the object 
The queries and analysis of their results
The requests submitted by users in Table 3 Our tests for these queries over different sizes of documents are analogous, in the way that the main difference is that the numbers of nodes contained in the query results are increased when the sizes of the documents are increased.
So instead of showing all the results we obtained -due space limit, we only show the results of Q2 for Tom in an XML document with a size of 10.5MB after the document is labelled, which can be found at Appendix 1.
Furthermore, in Table 6 we list the numbers of nodes returned for different applications, users and queries over XML documents before and after being labelled by our MAC model. can support such an application which requires that "the larger the category for an object is, so a larger number of users that can access it". More other tests were conducted for various purposes (but due to space limitation, only these two cases are reported here). Based on our tests, we can summery that:
(1) Our MAC model is capable of defining different label access policies according to different application requirements. Tests on two types (App1 and App2) of applications are reported in this paper. Our MAC model can support both of them. They demonstrate that our MAC model is effective and practical.
(2) Our approach provides tools for creating different policies based on different application requirements and produces the results users expected; it can assign labels to XML schemas and documents as well as users for different types of applications. It shows that our approach is very flexible.
The performance of the queries and analysis
For any operation in XML databases, the introduction of our MAC model would need more time to //listitem//keyword, is a complex query which involves ancestor-descendant structural joins. Fig.7 and Fig.8 show the response time for processing queries Q1 and Q5 on documents of different sizes in the XML database with and without the MAC. From the figures (Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 ) and table (Table 7) above, we may observe the following facts:
(1) In our experiments, the sizes of XML documents before and after the documents were labelled are shown in Table 7 . We can see that the size of documents increases by about 33% after the documents are labelled. The performance of the query process decreases due to the extra I/Os are required when the same queries are executed on the same documents after the documents are labelled (see Fig. 7 and Fig.8 ). When the sizes of documents are small, there is not much difference on response time for labelled and unlabelled documents, but when the size of documents increases the difference on response time can be clearly observed.
(2) When Q1 and Q5 are executed, one extra cost when MAC installed is filtering the intermediate results to
obtain the final results (in addition to the cost of extra disk I/O access due to the documents being labelled and documents sizes have been increased). When the size of the documents is increased, the performance of the system decreases, but the processing time for the same query over the same document before and after the document being labelled does not increase significantly, no matter the queries are simple or complex. As a result, it can be seen that the overall MAC system performance is rational, scalable and acceptable.
Related Work
A number of measures have been proposed for XML database security, including access control, encryption [9] , secure XML information publishing [13] , digital signatures and more, but it is generally agreed that access control is the most effective approach. There are usually three types of access control: mandatory access control (MAC), discretionary access control (DAC) and role-based access control (RBAC) [17, 25] .
Based on the BLP model [2] , SungRan Cho et al [4] proposed the first MAC model for XML documents.
However, in the model [4] the structure of DTD needs to be modified, and the structure of XML documents also has to be changed. Dong-Zhan Zhang et al [23] presented an extended MAC model for XML. They used strategies analogous to E. Damiani's model [5] for authorizing privileges and resolving label assignment conflicts but they defined their own label assignment and overriding rules. Lan Li et al [15] proposed a MAC model for XML documents, in which labels can be assigned to users and elements/attributes in XML documents. When a user wants to access an object in an XML document, the label of the user and the label of the element/attribute are compared according to the simple security property and the strict *-property in the BLP model. Since these three models are all based on the BLP model, they inherited its drawbacks -lack of sufficient flexible mechanisms to define different security policies for different applications. Different from those models, our MAC model can define the label structures and label access policies according to the security requirements of XML applications. Not only we can define label access policies for XML database systems in the similar ways that models [4, 15, 23] can, but our model also can work for multi-purpose applications. Meanwhile constraints between a read-access rule and a write-access rule are maintained so that the integrity of data is preserved. In addition, the rules for update-related operations, for exceptional privileges of both ordinary users and the administrators are proposed to maintain the security of the XML documents.
For relational database systems, Walid Rjaibi [18] proposed a multi-purpose MAC policy to enhance the flexibility of the MAC model. The administrator can define label types, label access rules, and exceptional privileges.
This policy is suitable for different requirements and applications in relational databases. In addition, Oracle 10g [14, 21] provides a label security product to enhance the flexibility of MAC. The models for Oracle databases are only suitable for relational databases, and in the model [18] , the domination relationship between two labels is not discussed in detail. Inspired by the MAC policy in [18] , a MAC model for XML databases is proposed. Meanwhile, the domination relationship in our model is not determined for any two labels because of the need of processing the INTERSECTION operation for label comparison (the reason was explained in Example 4 in Section 2).
Another type of XML access control is based on DAC [3, 5, 8, 11, 12, 16, 24] . However, these models cannot resist attacks like Trojan horse that may result in information leaks. The reason was explained in Example 6 (in Section 3).
XACML [17] is a specification of OASIS to express and deploy an access control policy based on XML and it is combined with RBAC models for XML [8, 25] . Although RBAC models are used in many applications, they can simplify the management of privileges of different roles for users. However, the limitation of the RBAC for XML has analogous security problems in DAC models because the invisible and sensitive data for a user or a role could be leaked by users or roles through transferring their own privileges to the other users or the roles (see Example 6) . In contrast, our model can prevent such security problems which exist in DAC and RBAC models.
Conclusions
Providing mandatory access control model for databases is important for many database applications. In this study, we have developed a practical MAC model for XML databases for different purposes, including multilevel secure XML database systems. In our MAC model, label access policies can be defined according to the requirements of various applications, which enhance the flexibility of MAC models in general. A constraint between a read-access rule and a write-access rule has been proposed to maintain the integrity of data. Rules for label assignment and propagation are presented to alleviate the workload of label assignments, and a rule for solving label assignment conflicts is also introduced. Moreover, rules for modification-related operations, and exceptional privilege rules for ordinary users and the administrators are introduced. Nevertheless, the proposed MAC policy can be flexibly used in XML databases; therefore, it can be regarded as a generalization of BLP model for XML.
Our MAC model has been implemented in an XML database, and the experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach; our approach can define different access policies, and is able to achieve and realize the design purposes of different access policies. A performance study on the overhead caused by introducing the MAC on an XML database was also carried out; the test results indicate that the performance is rational, scalable and acceptable overall.
In the future, we plan to extend out model to resolve the polyinstantiation problem for modification operations.
We are also studying the issues on optimizing system performance.
